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INTRODUCTION 
Illes and Lou’s article concerning the language used in order to describe and nominate disabilities is both thoughtful 
and provocative. Presenting a survey of disability language employed across a vast range of cultures, Illes and Lou’s 
study offers insight in how a term such as “mild developmental disability” might carry different meanings across 
cultures. Reflecting on these collected terms, Illes and Lou (2019) note: “Many questions arise from the database of 
disability terms we have assembled here. Among them, we ask: Given that language can be empowering or disabling, 
what place should cultural terminologies for disabilities have within disability conversations globally and in 
multicultural and pluralistic nations in the context of fostering an inclusive society?” (82).  
This is a question that is as important as it is big. It is not only big in the sense that it would seem to require a complex 
answer (or seemingly, sets of answers), but also complex in that it is a question that in turn raises other questions: 
Would the term “inclusive society” itself mean the same across different cultures and groups of people? What would 
the striving toward such an inclusive society ask of various people in terms of how they speak of disability and their 
cultural adjustment? And, which I want to focus on in this commentary, how and to what extent can we speak of the 
disabling or empowering of language?  
STIGMATIZATION AND THE NUANCES OF DISABILITY TERMINOLOGY 
Discussing the categories in which disability terms are placed, Illes and Lou write that the term value “denotes the 
valence of the terms and was further subcategorized based on whether the term had elevating (positive) or stigmatizing 
(negative) connotations” (76). The term “stigma” was famously defined by Erving Goffman (1963) as follows:  
While the stranger is present before us, evidence can arise of his possessing an attribute that makes him 
different from others in the category of persons available for him to be, and of a less desirable kind—in the 
extreme, a person who is quite thoroughly bad, or dangerous, or weak. He is thus reduced in our minds from 
a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one. Such an attribute is a stigma, especially when its 
discrediting effect is very extensive; sometimes it is also called a failing, a shortcoming, a handicap. (2–3)  
Goffman’s stigma is complex in that it is a recognized attribute by which someone is marked as “bad, dangerous, or 
weak,” but that the cultural operation of recognizing something as a “negative” attribute is the stigma. As such, 
Goffman’s definition offers insight into why a term such as “mental retardation” is experienced as being stigmatizing. 
Yet by fully separating the stigmatizing from the elevating, we are also accepting it as an “either/or” construction, and 
are then bypassing the question whether the use of a term could potentially be both. When we use term “intellectual 
disability” in preference to “mental retardation,” for example, does this mean that the first term is completely free of 
carrying stigmatizing qualities? As a term, “intellectual disability” might itself be perceived as being “politically 
correct,” while actually still be experienced and/or used as a negative and stigmatizing attribute by certain groups in 
specific cultural contexts and situations, even if the nature of the stigma may be different, in some respects, from the 
one attached to “mental retardation.”  
I am not arguing for a kind of banal relativism such that the language used to talk about disability ultimately would 
not matter, as I believe it does. Rather, I am arguing for a heightened and continuous sense of awareness of the fallacy 
of the bifurcation that certain terms would be stigmatizing and disabling, while others would be elevating and 
empowering. Second, I want to argue that we should examine and consider how terms are stigmatizing and 
empowering (and to what extent) in the cultural contexts in which they are used.  
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If we don’t strive to understand the interests of the various involved parties that are involved in the process of 
stigmatization, studies like that of Illes and Lou risk becoming reduced to “checklists” for which words to use, without 
the accompanying history of how these words have traveled and developed throughout different cultural contexts. 
Although Illes and Lou use the term “stakeholders” in their study, it seems that they use these terms mainly to refer 
to those people that are identified with having disabilities, which would in turn ignore that there are nearly always 
more “stakeholders” involved in the cultural processes that underlie stigmatization.  
In their study Narrative Prosthesis (2000), David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder have argued that the stigmatization of dis- 
ability is often a rhetorical device that propels forward narratives in which disability is featured, hence the title. They 
show how in various narratives, individuals and groups often have vested interests in people with disabilities and their 
places in society. Through this, they offer a valuable insight in the process of stigmatization: that the underlying 
motivation to stigmatize often involves the distribution of things such as power, wealth, and access to resources and 
education. Tobin Siebers, meanwhile, has argued in his Disability Theory (2008) that reclaiming and redefining the 
language around disability by disabled people may offer new possibilities to engage in identity politics and employ the 
language concerning disability on their own terms. By taking the language around disability in new directions for 
disabled people, Siebers’ study suggests that this might allow us to reframe the context and values that become attached 
to the language around disability.  
The motivation to name these books in commenting on Illes and Lou’s study is because I believe in the added value 
of placing academic discourse concerning bioethics and neuroethics in conversation with that of cultural disability 
studies. Although Illes and Lou acknowledge that the terminology surrounding disability is nuanced and varied, by 
dividing the collected terms into a schema, one needs to critically consider to what extent such a division primarily 
serves the purpose of offering a comprehensive overview and to what extent such a schematic presentation could 
concurrently do justice to the complexity of the sociocultural practices in which they are used. If more extensive 
anthropological fieldwork were done in tandem, in adjacency to reading these results in the contexts of the theory 
produced by cultural disability studies, a richer interpretation could be offered that would delineate the important 
nuances of disability terminology that now only remain briefly mentioned.  
DISABLING LANGUAGE AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 
Next to the term “stigmatizing,” Illes and Lou also employ the term “disabling” in their study on disability terminology. 
Although the two are not explicitly differentiated in the study, I believe it relevant to understand their potential 
differences and their value in studying disability terminology. As was noted in the Goffman quote, stigma rests on the 
operation of recognizing and perceiving a certain attribute in order to be able to differentiate a person as weak, bad, 
or dangerous. But this process of assigning the stigma does not yet fully cover the myriad ways in which language 
relates to the practice of stigmatization. Although it is of course fully possible to stigmatize someone by calling that 
person “retarded” in a given cultural context, language can also be disabling in other ways, even when not referring 
to disability explicitly. We can, for instance, easily imagine ways in which language is disabling while only implicitly 
referring to the stigma attached: for example, “Don’t give that book to him, it’s much too complex!” This example 
sentence does not nominate or describe a disability directly, but it is disabling by limiting the behavior a person should 
engage in. By circumventing the explicit reference to disability, such sentences may be harder to interpret as being 
stigmatizing but are not any less so.  
Though such language usage falls outside the scope of Illes and Lou’s article, as they situate their study in the context 
of “fostering a more inclusive society” it is important to recognize that the terminology used to describe and nominate 
disability is only a part of the stigmatizing practices attached to it. As political sensibilities to disability terminology 
may increase over time, it would arguably be somewhat naive to think that stigmatizing practices would concurrently 
lessen, dissolve, or disappear. Instead, as terminology surrounding disability becomes more nuanced across various 
cultural contexts, so too may the accompanying processes of stigmatization, and it may become increasingly difficult 
to recognize them as such.  
This relationship between stigmatizing and disabling language also offers perspective on the differentiation between 
descriptive categories and nominative terms in Illes and Lou’s study. In the schema provided, the nominative terms 
are separated from descriptive categories, but thereby any relationship between the nominative and the stigmatizing 
cannot be established. Referring back to my earlier argument where I wondered if certain terms can be entirely free 
of stigma, I also question whether nominative terms are entirely free of stigma and can thereby remain detached from 
the rest of the presented schema.  
If we momentarily ignore the nuances of stigmatization I’ve mentioned, Illes and Lou’s study offers important insight 
into the sheer difference in number of terms that are stigmatizing and elevating. Their study finds that 46% of the 
surveyed terms are dominantly stigmatizing, 39% are medicalizing, and only 14% are considered “elevating.” Similarly 
to how “elevating terms” might still carry stigma to some extent, the same question could of course be raised for those 
terms considered “medicalizing.” That said, the percentages given clearly show how elevating terms are in the minority. 
These numbers initially do not appear to offer much to rejoice about, but as Illes and Lou suggest in their study, they 
do offer the questions of what cross-cultural dialogues have to offer. In future study, I think it would be worthwhile 
to explore how the terms that were classified as being “elevating” operate in their cultural contexts, and consequently 
to consider whether and how those terms, or the concepts underlying them, could be relevant to other cultures and 
groups. Such future study however, should not be the task of bioethics and neuroethics alone; a fruitful collaboration 
and interchange with cultural disability studies and anthropology would be sure to enrich the interpretation and 
potential usage of future disability terminology.  
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